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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEDURAL mSTORY

This action was commenced by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents, David L. Caldwell and
Kathy C. Caldwell, Lawrence L. Seiler and Theresa L. Seiler, and Patricia St. Angelo, (hereinafter
"Caldwell") by Complaint filed October 17, 2008, against Respondents/Cross-Appellants, Thomas

w. Cometto and Lori M. Cometto, husband and wife (hereinafter "Cometto,,).l
This case arises from earlier litigation resulting in a Judgment in Bonner County Case No.
CV-1997-1057. (See Caldwell's Exhibits Nos. 25 and 26.) That earlier litigation stemmed from a
roadway which crossed the property owned by Cometto which served properties to the East of the
Cometto property.
Prior to entry of the Judgment and Easement Agreement, (Caldwell's Exhibits Nos. 25 and
26) the property had no recorded access to their properties. (See Cometto's Exhibit B.)2
Cometto relocated the existing roadway to its current location and the litigation in 1997
filed by Caldwell's predecessor in interest, Campbell, challenged Cometto's right to relocated under
I.e. § 55-313. (See Caldwell's Exhibits Nos. 26 and 27.)

1 During the course ofthese proceedings, at each hearing and at trial, the only Plaintiffs who
appeared and offered testimony were David L. Caldwell and Kathy C. Caldwell. The Plaintiffs
Seiler and St. Angelo failed to appear at trial and refused to participate in depositions and pretrial
discovery .
2 Despite Caldwell's assertion, there is no "unrecognized 60-foot easement" or any other
easement of record across the Cometto property according to Cometto's title report (Exhibit B).
On the eve of trial, Caldwell filed new claims. The motion has never been granted and no
Amended Complaint is in the record.

1

The 1997 litigation concluded with Cometto granting an easement over the relocated road in
favor of all three (3) properties, which was recorded. (See Caldwell's Exhibit No. 25) ("Easement
Agreement")
Kathleen Caldwell executed the final Easement Agreement incorporated into the Judgment
in Bonner County Case CV-1997-1057?
The Caldwell's Complaint or Petition sought several forms of relief as follows:
1.

That Caldwell is entitled to a 30-foot wide easement and the right to widen

the travel way constructed in 1997 to the full 30 feet;
2.

That Cometto is responsible for additional improvements under Idaho Code

55-313 to meet Bonner County Private Road Standards Ordinance for Subdivisions adopted in
2006;
3.

That Cometto be ordered to remove existing berms, ditches or other

materials outside of the easement;
4.

That Caldwell be allowed to relocate the easement to the historical location

adjacent to the Cometto residence as litigated in the prior litigation;
5.

That Cometto be ordered to construct the replacement easement to Bonner

County Private Road Standards Ordinance for Subdivisions;
6.

That Caldwell has a right and duty to maintain the easement road;

Mr. and Mrs. Caldwell purchased the unimproved IO-acre parcel immediately east of the
Cometto parcel in 2004 subsequent to the Easement agreement. (See Caldwell's Exhibit No. 27.)

3
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7.

That the easement is void as a matter of public policy pursuant to Idaho

Code § 29-114; and
8.

For additional injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. (R.Vol.I, pp.l 0-13)

Caldwell's Complaint also contains several inflammatory references and
accusations of coercion by Judge Michaud, killing of Caldwell's pet dog, shooting at Mr. Caldwell
and damage to Caldwell vehicle tires, which were never supported by testimony or evidence at trial.
(R Vol.I.,pp.23-25).
Trial was held September 2,3, and 4 of2008 and a Memorandum Decision was entered
March 20, 2009, denying all of the remaining claims for relief sought in the Caldwell's Complaint
and defining the easement rights consistent with Cometto's position. Most of Caldwell's claims
were dismissed at the outset of trial or on Cometto' s Rule 41 (b) Motion after Caldwell rested.
(RVol.III, pp.376-390; Tr. pp.326-350).
On July 1,2009, the Court entered a PARTIAL JUDGMENT based upon its prior
memorandum decision. (R.Vol.III, pp.437-447).
On August 6, 2009, the Court entered an AMENDED PARTIAL JUDGMENT. (RVol.III,
pp.473-482).
111ereafter the Trial C0U11 certified, pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Amended Partial Judgment.
(R.Vol.III, pp.498-499 and 505-515).
Caldwell filed a Notice of Appeal on November 19, 2009. (R.Vol.III, pp.516-518).
Cometto filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal on December 9, 2009. (R.Vol.III, pp.526-528).
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On July 10,2009, Cometto filed their Memorandum of Fees and Costs. (See Motion to
Augment.)
On July 14,2009, Caldwell filed their Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Arthur B.
Macomber in Support of Memorandum of Costs.
On July 24, 2009, Caldwell filed an Objection to Disallow Cometto's Fees and Costs.
On July 28,2009, Cometto filed an Objection and Motion to Disallow Caldwell's Fees and
Costs.
On October 8, 2009, the Court entered an Order Disallowing Cometto's and Caldwell's
Memorandum of Fees and Costs.
For reasons that are unclear, the Clerk's Record does not contain Cometto's Memorandum
of Fees and Costs, and the Court's Order Disallowing Fees and Costs. Cometto has filed a Motion
to Augment concurrent with this brief.

4
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B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case is relatively straightforward although it is profoundly complicated by the actions
of Caldwell and the circuitous route chosen by Caldwell's counsel.
The Complaint on file sought numerous forms of relief not provided for in the original
easement signed by Kathy Caldwell and recorded in the Bonner County Recorder's Office as
Instrument No. 570303. Caldwell's Exhibit 25. ("Easement Agreement").
Mrs. Caldwell is educated as a doctor of veterinary medicine. (Tr., p.l43, 11.4-6). Mrs.
Caldwell admitted she signed the Easement Agreement but she only "'scanned it" because she did
not "feel like reading through" it again. She did not carefully read it, but believed that the reference
to 30 feet meant a 30-foot-wide roadway, but did not "'read the details". (Tr., p.l 06, 11.6-9; 19-25;
Tr., p.l 07, 11.1-15).
Mrs. Caldwell testified that the sharp turn at the west entrance and east entrance to the
Cometto property and reflected on the exhibits to the Easement Agreement were impossible to
negotiate with large trucks. (Tr., pp.153, 11.1-12). Caldwell's testimony was impeached by the
DVD video of Mr. Caldwell driving a tractor trailer across the same roadway. (Cometto's Exhibits
H and I).
Both Mr. and Mrs. Caldwell conceded that the current roadway has not changed since the
Easement Agreement was signed by Was. Caldwell. (Tr., p.l61, 1.22-p.l62, 1.6; p.227, 11.6-15).
In particular Mr. Caldwell testified as follows: "The running surface, the travel surface is
substantially in the same location as it was before...... "' (Tr., p.227, 11.13-15).

5
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Additionally, Mr. and Mrs. Caldwell testified that the roadway and its width has not
substantially changed from 1999 until the date of trial and that several "mature", "large" trees exist
adjacent to the roadway and about 24 inches from the travelway, which existed in 1999. (Tr."
p.228, 11.4-18; Tr. p.l68, II. 8-14).
Despite this testimony, Caldwell, on appeal, asks that the Trial Court be reversed to allow
removal of the trees in the secondary easement granted by the Trial Court, but not sought in
Caldwell's complaint, thereby widening the easement beyond that defined in the Trial Court's
Judgment and the Easement Agreement.
Caldwells simply reiterate their argument made at the trial level, that their rights exceed that
defined in the Easement Agreement and that the Trial Court erred in not re-litigating the 1997
litigation under I.C.§55-313, and by disallowing tree removal outside the easement because it
impacts Mr. Caldwell's snowplowing with a dump truck and large plow. Caldwell argues that this
Court should reverse the Trial Court and thereby expand the Caldwell easement to encompass more
than that granted (and agreed to by Mrs. Caldwell) in the original Easement Agreement.
Caldwell further argues that the Trial Court erred by addressing and disallowing attorneys'
fees and costs in a "bifurcated action" though, to date, there is no "Amended Complaint" allowed or
filed in this action. This begs the question of what claims remain for future litigation.
Finally, Caldwell argues that they are the prevailing parties and are entitled to fees and
costs.

6
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C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When this court reviews a lower court's decision, it determines
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact support the conclusions of law. "A Trial Court's
findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal
in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the Trial Court's role as
trier of fact." Findings of fact based on substantial and competent
evidence will not be overturned on appeal even in the face of
conflicting evidence. It is the province of the district court to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 61,
190 P.3d 876, 880 (2008); quoting
Anderson v. Larsen, 136 Idaho 402, 405,
34 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2001)[cites omitted]
On appeal, the Appellate Court exercises free review over the Trial Court's conclusions of
law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law and whether the legal
conclusions are sustained by the fact in the record. Id; Anderson, supra at 406.
"Findings offact that are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting,
will not be overturned on appeal." Id.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Caldwell states the following as issues on appeal:

A.

Whether and to what extent the District Court's Amended Partial Judgment
erred in denying plaintiffs the right to completely remove mature trees from
the secondary easement areas for the purposes of maintenance of the
travelway and roadway.

B.

Whether the District Court erred in issuing its Order on Motions for Costs and
Attorneys Fees prior to the completion of the second half of the bifurcated case.

C.

Whether, and to what extent, the District Court's Order on Motions for
Costs and Attorneys Fees issued on the initial half of this bifurcated case was
correctly decided as to the substance thereof.

D.

Are Appellants (Caldwell) Entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal,
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41?

Cometto wishes to re-phrase the issues presented on appeal as follows:

A.

The District Court did not err in refusing to re-litigate issues pertaining to
the relocation of the easement within the Cometto property resolved by the
final Judgment in Bonner County Case No. CV-1997-1057.

B.

Whether the Trial Court was procedurally permitted to rule on Caldwell's and
Cometto's cross-claims for attorneys' fees and costs.

C.

The Trial Court erred by failing to analyze the claims of the parties and
erred in rmding that both Cometto and Caldwell prevailed in part.

D.

Whether Caldwell is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

E.

Whether Cometto is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

8
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III.

ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court did not err in refusing to re-litigate issues pertaining to
the relocation of the easement within the Cometto property resolved by the
final Judgment in Bonner County Case No. CV-1997-1057.

Although Caldwell's trial Counsel sought to litigate the 1997 relocation of the road, The
Trial Court made clear at the outset of trial it would not allow Plaintiffs a second bite at the I.C.
§55-313 issues resolved in the final judgment and Easement Agreement entered in 1999-2000.
The Court defined the issue at the outset of trial and in the Memorandum Decision, as a
determination of the width of the easement and any related easement rights granted in Instrument
No. 570303 ("Easement Agreement"). (Caldwell's Exhibit No. 25).
In the Easement Agreement, Comettos conveyed easement across the Cometto property
"located on the existing roadway" and as depicted on the Tucker Sketch attached to the Easement
Agreement as Exhibit "A".
Caldwell argues that they were entitled to more than the existing roadway including a
right to remove all trees adjacent to, but outside of, the roadway. Caldwell takes issue with the
Trial Court's determination that their easement rights were limited to the "existing roadway" as
defined in the Easement Agreement signed by Mrs. Caldwell. In particular, Caldwell appeals the
ruling that the mature trees (approximately 19) cannot be cut down or removed arguing that the
Easement Agreement implicity included those rights to the benefit of Caldwell.
At trial, Mrs. Cometto testified that she had no objection to the easement width including
the ditching on either side of the roadway for both drainage, maintenance and snow storage. The
roadway travels through several miles of forest service land and across forest service access, and
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was primarily used as snowmobile access during the winter months while Caldwell began
plowing about four (4) or five (5) years ago. Mrs. Cometto has no objection to the Caldwell's
use of the roadway during the winter by plowing or any objection to storage of snow adjacent to
the roadway. (Tr., pp.263-264; p.282, 11s.18-19; p. 285, 11.23-25). Caldwell has alternative snow
storage on their own property. (Memorandum Decision, R.Vol.III, pp.376-390; Tr, p.306, 11.1224).
The Cometto position is well articulated in the following colloquy:
Q.

. ... When Mr. Caldwell plows snow and it rolls off the side
of the plow adjacent to the road and into the ditches, do you
have any problem with that?

A.

No, I do not.

Q.

On the other hand, when Mr. Caldwell or someone else
chooses to plow snow up into a large pile either at the ends
of your road or driveway or somewhere else on your
property, is that a different issue in your mind?

A.

Yes it is.

Q.

Why?

A.

Because there's other portions. Where he wants to, seems
to be always where he knowingly has always known there
is personal property or a building or whatever. It seems
very on purpose.
Testimony of Lori Cometto, Tr., p.307, 11.3-16

Mrs. Cometto goes on to testify that the gate, yellow pickup and other personal property
items have existed in their current location since 1997 to 1999 and have not obstructed in any
fashion the existing roadway or travel on the road. (Tr., pp.292-309).

10
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The Trial Court adopted in its Decision and Judgment the testimony of Mrs. Cometto that
they did not object to Caldwell's snow storage in the ditching adjacent to the roadway and along the
west line and in the northwest comer of their property (Tr., p.317, 11.20-p.318, 11.2; R. VoUll, p.508)
1.

The Final Judgment and Memorandum Decision reflects Findings and
Conclusions that Cometto did not dispute and that was supported by
the historic use of the easement.

The question of whether an instrument or easement is ambiguous is a question of law.
C&G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 25 P.2d 76 (2001). The goal is to give effect to the intent of the
original grantor from the plain language of the deed unless the deed or instrument is ambiguous,
uncertain or doubtful, in which case the facts and circumstances surrounding the grant of easement
may be considered to determine the intent.
Caldwell asserts that they think the intent ofthe Easement Agreement was to give them a 30
foot wide roadway despite the plain language of the Easement Agreement. They sought that relief
in their Complaint. (R. Vol. I, Pp. 25-8)
A party's subjective, undisclosed interpretation of a word or phrase
cannot make the contract ambiguous. If it could, then all contracts
would be rendered ambiguous merely by a party asserting a
misunderstanding of the meaning of one or more of the words
used ....
The intent of the parties is determined from the plain meaning of the
words. A contract is not rendered ambiguous on its face because one
of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning that
differed from the ordinary meaning of those words.

Swanson v. Beco Construction Co.,
145 Idaho 59,63, 175 P.3d 748, 752 (2007)
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In this case, the Easement Agreement defmes the easement across the Cometto property as

"located on the existing roadway which traverses the Cometto property". The Trial Court found
according to the plain language of the Easement Agreement and the actions of the parties and
testimony of Mrs. Cometto. (R.Vol. I, pp. 49-55).
Although no reference is made within the Easement Agreement to secondary easements or
snow storage easements, the undisputed testimony of Mrs. Cometto is that the Comettos do not, and
have never, objected to snow storage, and that the existing road easement includes the adjacent
ditches and Caldwell's right to maintain the road. Mrs. Cometto went on to state that she had no
objection to Mr. Caldwell storing snow along the west boundary between the roadway and her
property line and at the west line and northwest comer of the roadway, but prior attempts by Mr.
Caldwell to widen the road and remove trees caused conflict with the Comettos.
The court's Findings and Conclusions summarized in the Amended Partial Judgment
simply memorialized the right already granted in the Easement Agreement ten years ago and the
secondary easement rights conceded by Mr. and Mrs. Cometto through prior usage and Mrs.
Cometto's testimony at trial.
The Trial Court's ruling should be affirmed.

2.

There is no issue raised by the pleadings on or appeal supporting
Caldwell's argument that the court failed to follow Idaho Code §55-313.

Much of the Caldwell's brief is spent discussing the history ofIdaho Code § 55-313 and its
supposed similarities to Idaho Code § 42-1207 and Idaho Code § 18-4308. This insistence by
Caldwell and/or their counsel on litigating those issues raised in the preceding litigation

12
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approximately thirteen (13) years ago was addressed by the Trial Court at the outset of trial as
barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel or claim preclusion.
Not only were the easement right, title and interest determined in the prior quiet title
proceedings and Easement Agreement, but additionally claims that might have been made in that
prior proceeding are barred by the disposition and fmal Judgment. See: Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho
254,260,668 P.2d 130, 1336 (App.l983); Watkins v. Peacock, 145 Idaho 704, 184 P.3d 210, 213
(2008).
In this instance, the prior final Judgment and Easement Agreement resolved questions
regarding compliance with Idaho Code § 55-313. The testimony establishes that it was Mr. and
Mrs. Cometto' s movement of the road in 1997 from their home to its current location that instigated
the litigation with Caldwell's predecessor, Mr. and Mrs. Campbell, and St. Angelo's predecessor,
Mr. and Mrs. Crum (CV-1998-00867).
As a result, all of Section V. A. of the Caldwell brief is an inexplicable attempt to re-litigate
those issues resolved by Judgment and the Easement Agreement.
The Trial Court made clear at the outset of trial that the issue at trial concerned only the
interpretation of the Easement Agreement and the existing road that the parties agreed to in 1999
when the Easement Agreement was signed. (Tr.p.20, 11.10-12).
The Trial Court should be affirmed on these points raised by Caldwell.

13
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3.

The Trial Court properly prohibited removal of existing trees outside of
the travelway easement and within the adjacent secondary easement.

Caldwell desires to remove approximately nineteen (19) mature, existing trees growing
outside the road easement. The trees existed in 1999 when the Easement Agreement was signed.

Mr. Caldwell testified that the trees in question were anywhere from two (2) feet to several
feet off of the roadway at the time they purchased the property in 1999 and at the time the Easement
Agreement was executed by his wife, Mrs. Caldwell.

(Tr.p.228, 11.9-25 p.229, 11.1-4).

Mr.

Caldwell testified that the trees make it difficult for him to plow the roadway with the vehicle he
currently uses for plowing. The Trial Court found that that Caldwell failed to support these claims
by a preponderance of the evidence. Order Denying Motion to Amend, R. VoL III, P. 434-6.
There is, therefore, no basis to determine that the court erred in interpreting the Easement
Agreement to prohibit removal of the existing, mature trees outside of the roadway easement and
within the secondary easement designated for drainage, ditching and snow storage.
The Appellants Caldwell has simply reiterated their disagreement with the Trial Court's
findings of fact.

This Court should affirm the Trial Court's ruling on this issue and award

attorneys' fees and costs to Cometto on appeal.

B.

Whether the Trial Court was procedurally permitted to rule on Caldwell's and
Cometto's cross-claims for attorneys' fees and costs.

Counsel for Caldwell incorrectly represents that the Trial Court granted Plaintiffs'
(Caldwell) Motion to Amend Pleadings and bifurcated the proceedings. Based upon this incorrect
statement, Caldwell argues the Trial Court should not have awarded attorneys' fees and costs.
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On August 27, 2008, the Plaintiffs (Caldwell) filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to
Conform to Evidence. (R.Vol.U, pp.319-324). Caldwell's Motion was never scheduled for hearing
and claims numerous additional causes of action based on supposed recorded easements.
On the first day of trial, the Trial Court clearly stated it would defer or reserve until after
trial any hearing or consideration on Caldwell's Motion to Amend, essentially bifurcating the
proceedings, if the Trial Court were to grant a Motion to Amend in post-trial proceedings. (T.p.l1,
11.8-17, p.12, 11.9-14 and p.23, 11.6-8).
The record reflects that no Amended Complaint has been filed and no Motion to Amend has
been granted or even noticed for hearing.
The Trial Court entered a Memorandum Decision after trial and subsequently certified the
Judgment.
LR.C.P. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that at any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of
the court any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a Memorandum of Costs
and that a Memorandum filed prematurely shall be considered timely. LR.C.P.54(d)(5)(2009).

In this case, there are no additional issues or any Amended Complaint before the Trial Court
or before this Court, which would set forth additional issues to be decided and, therefore, the final
Judgment disposing of the claims set forth in Caldwell's October 17, 2007 Complaint is the final
Judgment of the only claims pending in this action.
Caldwell further argues certain federal cases of Association of Frigidaire Model Makers v.
th

General Motors Corporation, 51 F.3d 271 (6 Cir. 1995) and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v.
Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976). Both cases are distinguishable as matters in tort where liability was
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bifurcated from the damage claims. "If an order or judgment ends the suit, adjudicates the subject
matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, the
instrument constitutes a final judgment. Opportunity, LLC v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 38 P.3d
1258 (2002); quoting Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362,366 (1999)

In this case, all of the matters plead in Caldwell's Complaint filed October 17, 2007, have
been adjudicated with the Trial Court dismissing or denying all of Caldwell's claims.
As such, the Partial Judgment was a Final Judgment of the issues and it was, therefore,
procedurally appropriate for the Trial Court to determine an award of fees and costs.
Assuming arguendo that additional claims exist, not yet articulated by Caldwell in an
Amended Complaint, the Trial Court's determination of fees and costs was still procedurally
appropriate, as all issues of interpreting the Easement Agreement are resolved.
The Easement Agreement in question provides in pertinent part as follows:
12.
In the event that any dispute arises regarding the
interpretation, application, breach or enforcement of the provision of
this Agreement, then the prevailing party in such dispute shall be
entitled to recover their attorneys' fees and costs incurred, including
attorneys' fees and costs incurred on appeal.
Caldwell's Exhibit No. 25, p.3, ~12

The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and subsequent Judgment reflect a complete and
final ruling on the respective rights of the parties under the Easement Agreement. It is, therefore, a
[mal and complete disposition of that issue and award of attorneys' fees and costs is an appropriate
consideration.
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The unspecified (and heretofore unfiled) Caldwell claims under certain "recorded"
documents may also entitle a party to seek fees and costs, but that does not prohibit the Trial
Court's ruling on fees in the current action.
There is no legal basis for the Court to defer a determination of the prevailing party and
award attorneys' fees and costs accordingly.

C.

The Trial Court erred by failing to analyze the claims of the parties and
erred in finding that both Cometto and Caldwell prevailed in part.

The Trial Court's determination of prevailing party is one in the discretion of the court.
The Trial Court's discretion is reviewed on appeal, in the following manner:
When examining whether a Trial Court abused its discretion, this
Court considers whether the Trial Court: (1) perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of this
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by
an exercise of reason.
Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915,
204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009)
The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court's finding of no prevailing party in Shore v.
Peterson, where Peterson prevailed on his affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, though
he had not prevailed on other claims for relief.
The Trial Court is required to consider the final judgment in relation to the relief sought
by the respective parties and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each issue or claim in
determining a prevailing party, though the Court need not apportion its award for each claim.
Chenery v. Agri-Lines, Corp. 106 Idaho 687,693,682 P.2d 640,646 (App. 1984).
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Despite Cometto's argument at hearing on September 4, 2009, the Trial Court did not
perform this analysis in determining a prevailing party. On October 8, 2009, the Trial Court
determined that Caldwell prevailed in part, in written findings, as follows:
The Court finds that both parties prevailed on their most significant
claims. Caldwells prevailed in the sense that they need sufficient
room to keep the road plowed during the winter. Comettos prevailed
on their most significant claim that the broader claims of relief of the
Caldwells were not necessary. However, for each party to prevail,
the Court had to order a survey and do an extensive view of the
premises to craft the Court's Opinion.
. . . The absence of a survey at the time of the original Easement
Agreement is not a basis for determining a prevailing party in the
current litigation.

R.Vol.III, pp.502-503
In this matter, Caldwell's complaint sought a thirty (30) foot wide easement and the right
to construct the road to that width, or alternatively, to reposition the road to its prior location
(when Caldwell's predecessors had no recorded easement) and re-litigate Idaho Code §55-313.
Caldwell also sought a variety of other matters including a determination that the indemnity
provision was void under Idaho Code §29-114 and removal of certain "obstructions" from the
easement. The Court denied all of Caldwell's pled claims, with many dismissed prior to trial or
at the close of Caldwell's case. The trial testimony estabiished that no obstructions were in the
travelway easement. The only matter determined in the Memorandum Decision was that the
width of the ingress/egress easement is the travelway (which, by all witnesses' testimony, is
unchanged since 1999) and granting Caldwell a secondary snow storage easement conceded in
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Mrs. Cometto's testimony as reasonable and necessary though not request by Caldwell in their
pleadings.
The Trial Court erred as a matter of law in not analyzing the specific claims of Caldwell
and Cometto. If the Trial Court had done so, the analysis would have revealed that Caldwell did
not prevail on any claim set forth in their Complaint. By contrast, Cometto's Answer pled that
Caldwell's easement rights were defined in the Easement Agreement as confined to the existing
road which both Cometto and Caldwell concede is unchanged since 1999.

Mrs. Cometto

testified she has never objected to snow storage along and adjacent to the road as long as
Caldwell stays on the road, and she volunteered the portions of the Cometto property for snow
storage on the west side and northwest comer of the road, that the Trial Court awarded as a
secondary easement for snow storage. (Tr. p.282., 11. 8-19; p. 285, 11 .. 23-25; p. 286, p. 306,11.
12-25; Tr. p. 307,11. 3-6).
Later, Mrs. Cometto testified that she understood that the 1999 Easement Agreement
included the adjoining ditches. (Tr., p.312, 11.6-25).
This conflict stems from Mr. Caldwell's attempt to forcibly relocate the east exit/entrance
of the roadway and consistent attempts to fall trees and widen the roadway in 2004.

Cometto

placed a rock or boulder at the southeast comer of the road and a panel wood fence on the
property line at the northeast comer of the road to try to contain Mr. Caldwell from expanding or
relocating the road on the Cometto property. (Tr., p. 310, 11. 5-24; p. 312, 11. 2-5; pp. 274-275;
p.314).
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Caldwell concedes in their testimony that they did not read the Easement Agreement
when signing it in early 2000 and hoped to renegotiate a wider or different easement later.
Failing that, Mr. Caldwell engaged in a forcible trespass by trying to punch a new road out of the
Cometto property and requiring law enforcement assistance. (Tr .. pp. 300-303; p.314; p.321).
Finally, Caldwell filed this suit making sweeping claims, all of which were rejected by the Trial
Court.
Cometto was the prevailing party and should have been awarded fees and costs.

D.

Whether Caldwell is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

For the reasons set forth above, the Trial Court's fmdings concerning the secondary
easement should be affirmed subject only to a reversal of the Trial Court's denial of Cometto's
attorneys' fees and costs. .
Caldwell claims attorneys' fees on appeal (Appellant's Brief, Section VD. Caldwell does
not cite the court to any statutory authority, only claim fees pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35
and 41.
Where a party fails to cite any statutory or contractual authority for attorneys' fees and
only cites the Idaho Appellate Rules, no fees shall be awarded on appeal. Mortensen v. Stewart
Title, 2010 W.L. 1643997 (Idaho, 2010).
When issues are cited on appeal, but not supported by law, authority or argument, they
will not be considered. Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732, 735 (1995); see also
PHH Mortgages Services Corp. v.

Perreir~

146 Idaho 631, 641, 200 P.3d 1180, 1190 (2009).
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The Idaho Appellate Rules without citation to applicable statutory, contractual or other
case law, are insufficient to support a claim of attorneys' fees on appeal. See Athay v. Stacey,
142 Idaho 360,371, 128 P.3d 897, 908 (2005).
Caldwell does briefly recite that the Easement Agreement contains a provision for
attorneys' fees on appeal. However, Caldwell did not prevail on a single claim arising from the
Easement Agreement.
The issues appealed by Caldwell concern the secondary rights determined by the Trial
Court from Mrs. Cometto's testimony. Caldwell argues in post trial motions and on this appeal,
the right to remove trees within the secondary easement awarded by the Trial Court. This claim
was neither pled nor argued by Caldwell in their Complaint or at trial.
Further, these secondary easement rights were not defined nor provided for in the
Easement Agreement and, therefore, the attorneys' fees provision contained therein does not
apply since it was not an ""interpretation, application of, or breach or enforcement of' the
provisions of the Easement Agreement. Caldwell's Exhibit 25.
This Court should deny Caldwell's claim for attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

E.

Whether Cometto is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.

The Appellants Caldwell have proffered nothing new to this Court in terms of legal issues
or errors in the court's findings that were not raised before the Trial Court. (See Cometto's
Motion to Augment.)
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Cometto is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees on
appeal where a contract or agreement provides such as in Section 12 of the Easement Agreement.
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Further, Idaho Code § 12-121 allows Cometto an award of attorneys' fees as a prevailing
party on appeal where the action is brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Idaho Code § 12-121(2010).
An award of attorney's fees under this statute is appropriate if the
appellant simply invites the Appellate Court to second guess the
Trial Court on conflicting evidence.

Benninger v. Derifield, 145 Idaho 373, __
179 P.3d 336,341 (2008)

When an appeal simply disputes the Trial Court's factual findings,
which are supported by substantial, although conflicting, evidence,
the appeal is considered frivolous and an award of attorney's fees is
proper underI.C. § 12-121.
Electric Wholesale Supply Company v. Nielson,
136 Idaho 814, 828,41 P.3d 242,256 (2001)

In this matter, Caldwell is inviting the Appellate Court to second guess District Judge

Hosack's determination that the mature trees cannot be removed from the secondary easement
area.
Caldwell does not cite this Court to any error of law to support their position on appeal.
Caldwell has offered no new legal basis to overturn the District Court's decision on appeal.
Further, Caldwell has not demonstrated any reversible error in the court's Findings of Fact but,
rather, ask this Appellate Court to second guess the Trial Court's findings.
Cometto is entitled to an award of attorneys'
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fees and costs on appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court is asked to affirm the Trial Court's

Memorandum Decision and Amended Partial Judgment entered October 8, 2009 and award
Cometto their attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
On Cometto's Cross-Appeal, this Court is respectfully asked to reverse the Trial Court's
Order of October 8, 2009 finding that Cometto was not a prevailing party and remand with
instructions to award Cometto attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Easement Agreement and
Idaho law.
On their Cross Appeal, Cometto requests attorneys fees and costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11 th day of June, 2010.

Attorney for Respondents/Cross-Appellants
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